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INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to have the opportunity to celebrate Professor Wendy Gordon’s 
scholarship. Her work is synonymous with rigor and excellence, and our 
understanding of copyright is better because of it. 
In this brief Essay, I will discuss something of interest to Professor Gordon 
and others, namely the “if value/then right” principle and its consequences for 
intellectual property, particularly copyright law. That principle, which the U.S. 
Copyright Act does not embrace,1 expresses the intuition that “wherever value 
is received, a legal duty to pay arises, regardless of whether imposing that legal 
duty serves public welfare.”2 
The if value/then right principle concerns Professor Gordon because she 
believes that it expresses socially unproductive hostility to free riding.3  If a legal 
obligation to pay arises whenever someone receives a benefit from another, 
copyright rights (and indeed all IP rights) would be quite broad, extending to all 
cases of free riding.4 Professor Gordon believes, however, that copyright law 
should allow copying that, in principle, supports the creation of new works 
without unduly damaging copyright incentives because doing so gives society 
the benefit of new works based on harmless copying without causing the loss of 
other works.  Of course, copyright does not completely follow this prescription.  
Professor Gordon sees various aspects of copyright that appear motivated not by 
concern for overall social welfare but by general hostility to free riding.  She 
 
1 See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (giving examples of copyright doctrines 
that permit borrowing, such as the idea/expression dichotomy, substantial similarity, and fair 
use). 
2 Draft from Wendy J. Gordon, Professor of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Members of 
“A Celebration of the Work of Wendy Gordon” Symposium 2 (June 14, 2019) (on file with 
the Boston University Law Review) (quoting from an excerpt Professor Gordon emailed to 
symposium participants prior to publication). Other discussions of if value/then right include 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405-06 (1990) (questioning idea that relationship 
between value and ownership justifies granting trademark rights); Wendy J. Gordon, On 
Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 
149, 178-80, 244 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning Information] (examining impact of 
pro-plaintiff rule in providing incentive and fostering creativity); Peter Lee & Madhavi 
Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 277, 285-88 (2013) 
(suggesting that current protection of design patents is expansive); Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1065-69 (2005) (disapproving 
of the goal of eliminating free riding). 
3 E-mail from Wendy Gordon, Professor of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Alfred C. 
Yen, Professor of Law, Bos. Coll. Law Sch. (Nov. 17, 2019) (on file with author). 
4 See Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 2, at 167 (“[W]hen taken literally, as a 
standalone prohibition on free riding, the restitutionary claim is drastically overbroad. A 
culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited within it.”). 
  
2019] BRIEF THOUGHTS ABOUT IF VALUE/THEN RIGHT 2481 
 
then wonders why the law is so hostile to free riding and investigates the appeal 
of “if value/then right” as a possible explanation.5 
Professor Gordon has good reason to worry about the consequences of 
embracing if value/then right. Courts do not directly cite the principle, but they 
follow it in problematically expansive copyright decisions that consider copying 
sufficient to establish infringement. For example, in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films,6 the Sixth Circuit held that all instances of digital sampling, 
no matter how small, constitute copyright infringement.7 This decision was 
remarkable because it overlooked the well-established rule that de minimis 
borrowings do not constitute infringement.8 Moreover, the belief that any 
uncompensated taking establishes a fundamental wrong clearly influenced the 
court’s decision to overlook the de minimis principle.9 It is beyond the scope of 
this Essay to discuss why cases like Bridgeport Music are problematically broad. 
For now, it will suffice to note that Bridgeport Music expanded the scope of 
copyright infringement in ways that other courts have not.10 
I would like to respond to this concern about if value/then right by making 
two observations that shed light on the principle’s appeal and its consequences 
for copyright law. First, I will offer the law and economics “ultimatum game” 
as a partial explanation for the influence of if value/then right.11 Experimenters 
designed this game to test the division of a windfall by two people. The 
experimenter offers a windfall of money (say $100) to Person A. The only 
condition to receipt of the windfall is that Person A must offer to share it with 
Person B. Person A can choose to share any portion of the windfall with Person 
B, but there is a catch. Person A can make only one offer for sharing with Person 
 
5 Email from Wendy J. Gordon, Professor of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Members 
of “A Celebration of the Work of Wendy Gordon” Symposium (July 21, 2019) (on file with 
author); see also Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 2, at 238-44. 
6 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
7 Id. at 801 (“[A] sound recording owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own 
recording.”). Later, the court wrote “Get a license or do not sample.” Id. 
8 See id. at 797-98 (referring to district court’s use of de minimis principle, but then 
reversing). 
9 See id. at 801 (quoting with approval biblical admonition “Thou shalt not steal”) (citing 
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (quoting same admonition at beginning of opinion holding defendant liable for 
sampling)). 
10 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting 
Bridgeport Music’s elimination of de minimis principle); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 
1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying de minimis principle to find that three-note sample was not 
infringement). 
11 See Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 370-72 (1982) (introducing and 
describing “ultimatum game” concept). 
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B, and if Person B rejects the offer, then both forego the windfall.12 The 
ultimatum game has gained fame in part because its results illustrate that 
something beyond economic self-interest governs human behavior.13 Person A’s 
offer to share with Person B, no matter how small, represents a windfall to 
Person B as well. Even if Person A offers only $1 out of $100, acceptance makes 
Person B financially better off than rejection. One might therefore expect that 
those in Person B’s position typically accept Person A’s offer—even if it is small. 
However, this is not what happens. Instead, those receiving the offer typically 
reject it unless the offer approaches twenty percent of the original windfall.14 
Pondering the possible reasons for why Person B typically rejects low offers of 
sharing provides insight into why society might accept the if value/then right 
principle. In particular, people apparently accept the notion that it is better for 
all to go without the benefits of a windfall unless there is appropriate reciprocity 
among all those responsible for creating the windfall.15 
Second, the persistence of if value/then right does not necessarily mean that 
the principle leads to broader intellectual property rights. Although if value/then 
right may justify claims from an upstream creator against any downstream 
beneficiary, the same principle also generates claims against our hypothetical 
creator from others upstream from her. Thus, taking if value/then right seriously 
means that intellectual property law should account for both of these 
possibilities. Such accounting can limit the scope of intellectual property rights. 
I. THE ULTIMATUM GAME 
One reason to be puzzled about if value/then right is its rejection of some 
“Pareto-superior” social arrangements—namely, arrangements that increase the 
welfare of some without harming the welfare of others.16 Economists generally 
 
12 Id. at 371 (“The difference between the amount c (>0), which can be distributed, and a1 
is what player 1 wants to leave for player 2. Given the decision of player 1 player 2 has to 
decide whether he accepts player l’s proposal or not. If 2 accepts, player 1 gets a1, and player 
2 gets c – a1. Otherwise both players get zero.”). 
13 See Eric van Damme et al., How Werner Güth’s Ultimatum Game Shaped Our 
Understanding of Social Behavior, 108 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 292, 292 (2014) (explaining 
that ultimatum game, first introduced by Güth in 1982, proved to be an influential study 
because it challenged the assumption that individuals are selfish and rational); Werner Güth 
& Martin G. Kocher, More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, 
Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature, 108 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 396, 399 
(2014) (“The ultimatum game has been relevant as an empirical example and as guidance for 
developing new theoretical models of other-regarding preferences.”). 
14 See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and 
Manners, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 209, 210 (“Offers of less than 20 percent are 
frequently rejected.”); Simon Knight, Fairness or Anger in Ultimatum Game Rejections?, 3 
J. EUR. PSYCHOL. STUDENTS 2, 11 (2012) (stating same). 
15 See infra Part I (discussing preferences when windfall is not shared appropriately). 
16 See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 97-98 (1988) (exemplifying 
that situation A is Pareto superior to situation B if in situation A at least one person is better 
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consider Pareto-superior moves desirable because they increase overall social 
welfare without imposing losses on anyone.17 In a sense, Pareto-superior moves 
represent gains without any offsetting losses. 
In some cases of uncompensated borrowing, the downstream author and 
society stand to benefit from creation of a new work based on the downstream 
borrowing, while the upstream author suffers no loss from the borrowing. In 
other words, the borrowing does not result in competition or substitution for any 
stream of revenue already enjoyed by the upstream author. For example, the 
borrower might be a search engine using thumbnails of copyrighted images in 
search results,18 or the borrowing might be so small that it is unrecognizable.19 
In such situations, allowing uncompensated borrowing would improve the 
welfare of the downstream borrower and those who consume or use her work 
while causing no decrease in the upstream author’s welfare. Such 
uncompensated borrowing could be accepted as normatively desirable because 
society’s total welfare is increased without imposing losses on anyone. 
However, if value/then right rejects this argument simply because the 
downstream borrower benefits without paying the upstream author.  
One can certainly argue that it is foolish to embrace if value/then right because 
it rejects some Pareto-superior social changes. Those adopting this argument 
may hope that judges would quickly reject if value/then right reasoning as soon 
as they realized the existence of lost Pareto-superior improvements. Proponents 
of such thinking probably find the persistence of if value/then right puzzling 
because it exemplifies an irrational policy. 
The ultimatum game suggests that, in some cases, people actually prefer to 
forego Pareto-superior arrangements when the windfalls in question are not 
shared appropriately. The ultimatum game involves two people who stand to 
benefit from a windfall. Remember, the ultimatum game always involves 
acceptance or rejection of a Pareto-superior state of affairs. Any shared amount 
of the windfall leaves Person B better off than she previously was. Thus, every 
proposed division represents a Pareto improvement for a hypothetical two-
person society comprised of Persons A and B. The fact that real people in Person 
B’s position often reject Person A’s proposal demonstrates that people 
sometimes willingly forego windfalls if those windfalls are not properly 
distributed or shared. 
Unfortunately, there is no complete explanation for why those in Person B’s 
position forego Pareto-superior arrangements. However, one significant theme 
 
off than she was in situation B and if no one is worse off in situation A than she was in situation 
B). 
17 See, e.g., id. at 100 (“Allocations that are Pareto superior increase at least one person’s 
utility without adversely affecting the utility of another; they produce winners but no losers.”). 
18 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that search engine display of thumbnail images on third-party websites was fair use). 
19 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying de minimis 
principle to find that three-note sample was not infringement). 
  
2484 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:2479 
 
appears to be reciprocity.20 Intuitively, if Person B helps Person A get a windfall, 
it is not right for Person A to share almost none of it with Person B, even if 
Person B’s help is minimal (in other words, if Person B does nothing more than 
accept his proposed share of the windfall).21 Instead, Person A has an obligation 
to share an appropriate portion of his windfall with Person B.22 This moral 
intuition is apparently strong enough that people will pass up modest financial 
gain to enforce the intuition as a norm.23 
This intuition may explain why if value/then right has appeal. Our 
downstream defendant (Person A) may be in position to enjoy a windfall—the 
work he has created—but he needed the “help” of the upstream author (Person 
B), from whose work he copied. Under the principle derived from the ultimatum 
game, the downstream defendant has an obligation to share his windfall 
appropriately with the upstream author.24 If no offer has been made, society 
 
20 See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passé? Homo Reciprocans and the 
Future of Egalitarian Politics, BOS. REV., Dec.-Jan. 1998-99, at 6, 8-9 (explaining that there 
are many situations in which humans act generously and reciprocally rather than self-
interestedly); see also Camerer & Thaler, supra note 14, at 218 (explaining that ensuring 
fairness between parties outweighs cost of rejecting windfall benefits); Mark F. Schultz, Fear 
and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to 
Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 706-08 (2006) (explaining that ultimatum 
game demonstrates that people will not only cooperate at cost to themselves but also punish 
others at cost to themselves). 
21 See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 20, at 6 (“When asked why they offer more than one 
cent, proposers commonly say that they are afraid that respondents will consider low offers 
unfair and reject them as a way to punish proposer’s [sic] unwillingness to share.”). 
22 See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 14, at 216-17 (discussing involvement of etiquette 
and good manners in economic business practice balancing fairness with self-interest). 
23 See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 20, at 9 (“Those surveyed by pollsters exhibit what we 
have termed ‘basic needs generosity,’ a virtually unconditional willingness to share with 
others to assure them of some minimal standard . . . .”); see also Camerer & Thaler, supra 
note 14, at 217 (describing two experiments showing that “competition can push ultimatum 
offers closer to zero, in ways consistent with [concept of] fairness” in game theory); Schultz, 
supra note 20, at 708 (highlighting differences between ultimatum and dictator games). 
However, it may be true that raising expected gains can overcome concerns about reciprocity 
and fairness if the expected gain is sufficiently large. Studies testing this theory have shown 
mixed results. Compare Steffen Andersen et al., Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games, 101 AM. 
ECON. REV. 3427, 3428 (2011) (showing that significantly “high stakes” variations of 
ultimatum game may lead to fewer rejections, even if proportions between offering party and 
responder are significantly unequal), with Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the 
Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47, 58 (1999) 
(showing no significantly different proportional distribution of offers during “high stakes” 
ultimatum game compared to “low stakes” game, even though responders did exhibit 
increased willingness to accept given percentage offer in higher-stakes games). 
24 Camerer & Thaler, supra note 14, at 217 (explaining that self-interested proposers keep 
in mind responder’s nature to reject seemingly unfair and low offers). 
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prefers to go without the windfall until appropriate sharing occurs, even if it 
means rejecting a Pareto-superior improvement in overall social welfare. 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IF VALUE/THEN RIGHT 
If we accept that if value/then right has sufficient appeal to persist in 
copyright, it makes sense to think through what its consequences might be. Most 
think about if value/then right as an expansive force for intellectual property 
rights.25 Present law does not make all borrowing from copyrighted works 
actionable. Doctrines like the idea/expression dichotomy,26 substantial 
similarity,27 and fair use28 all shield certain types of borrowings from copyright 
liability. Allowing a copyright plaintiff to recover simply by showing that the 
defendant borrowed from the plaintiff’s work would effectively overrule these 
doctrines, thereby expanding the scope of copyright.29 It is possible, however, 
for if value/then right to have different consequences. 
Accepting for the sake of discussion that it is wrong for a downstream 
borrower to benefit without compensating his upstream sources implies that a 
person who has not paid such compensation is unjustifiably wealthier than he 
should be, and this injustice persists until the debt is paid to the upstream source. 
The power of if value/then right comes in part from plaintiffs asserting that they 
are the victims of such injustice. 
It is a truism to recognize that all authors, including the greatest creative 
geniuses of all time, have borrowed from others. For example, George Frideric 
Handel notoriously borrowed from many sources to craft his compositions.30 
 
25 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 405-06 (criticizing lack of coherent limit in owner’s 
right to control and convincing defenses against parodies in trademark cases); Gordon, On 
Owning Information, supra note 2, at 166-68 (noting that obligation to pay for all “free riding” 
eradicates culture); Lee & Sunder, supra note 2, at 298 (arguing that if value/then right 
rationale for design patent rights negates purpose of intellectual property law); Lemley, supra 
note 2, at 1051-52, 1057 (stating that regulation of nonrivalrous use produces absolute 
protection and discourages innovations). 
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (allowing free borrowing of ideas by excluding them 
from copyright protection); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880) (explaining that 
copyright does not protect a plaintiff’s ideas); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 
119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding no copyright infringement when defendant only borrowed 
ideas from plaintiff’s work); see also Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that plaintiff cannot prevent others from making realistic sculptures of jellyfish 
because that is an idea). 
27 See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that copyright infringement requires proof that two works are “substantially 
similar”); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (finding that infringement 
requires a degree of similarity amounting to “improper appropriation”). 
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that fair use of copyrighted work is not infringement). 
29 Id. 
30 See George J. Buelow, The Case for Handel’s Borrowings: The Judgment of Three 
Centuries, in HANDEL TERCENTENARY COLLECTION 61, 65-67 (Stanley Sadie & Anthony 
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Mozart based his Thirty-Seventh Symphony on one by Michael Haydn.31 
Brahms frequently borrowed from Beethoven.32 And Handel himself became a 
“victim” of borrowing at the hands of Gustav Mahler, who used a theme from 
Messiah in his First Symphony.33 
Similarly, in painting, Édouard Manet clearly borrowed the composition and 
subject matter for his works Olympia and The Luncheon on the Grass.34 Van 
Gogh imitated the look and composition of Hiroshige.35 Roger Brown freely 
admitted basing some of his Puerto Rican Wedding on Edward Hopper’s 
Nighthawks.36 And Stanley Kubrick appears to have found inspiration for a 
scene in The Shining from a photograph by Diane Arbus.37 
 
Hicks eds., 1987) (observing Handel’s borrowings from other composers to create “his own 
style”). 
31 See Georg Predota, “Good Composers Borrow, Great Ones Steal!,” INTERLUDE (July 
24, 2016), http://www.interlude.hk/front/good-composers-borrow-great-ones-steal/ [https: 
//perma.cc/7HWX-QCR8] (discussing Mozart using symphony by Michael Haydn as basis 
for his Thirty-Seventh Symphony). 
32 See Charles Rosen, Influence: Plagiarism and Inspiration, 4 19TH-CENTURY MUSIC 87, 
88-89 (1980) (mentioning Brahms borrowing from Beethoven in Brahms’s Symphony no. 1, 
Piano Sonata in C Major, and in his Piano Concerto no. 1); Scott Simon, Brahms: Breaking 
the Mold Beethoven Built, NPR (July 14, 2007, 10:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates 
/story/story.php?storyId=11947519 [https://perma.cc/K8H4-3UVY] (mentioning Brahms 
borrowing from Beethoven’s Fifth and Ninth Symphonies in Brahms’s Symphony no. 1). 
33 See Timothy Judd, 3 Musical Allusions to Handel’s “Hallelujah Chorus,” LISTENERS’ 
CLUB (Mar. 25, 2016), https://thelistenersclub.com/2016/03/25/3-musical-allusions-to-
handels-hallelujah-chorus/ [https://perma.cc/X869-SU94] (suggesting echo of Hallelujah 
chorus in Mahler’s First Symphony); Michael Lewanski, On Mahler’s 1st Symphony, or, Why 
Only a Conductor Could Have Written This Piece, MICHAEL LEWANSKI, CONDUCTOR: BLOG 
(Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.michaellewanski.com/blog/2016/3/11/dg2at8i1bz67qvkucneoiy 
0na7pzw3 [https://perma.cc/JP4L-L656] (indicating that finale of Mahler’s First Symphony 
resembles lines “[a]nd he shall reign for ever and ever” from Handel’s Messiah). 
34 See Rolf Læssøe, Édouard Manet’s “Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe” as a Veiled Allegory of 
Painting, 26 ARTIBUS ET HISTORIAE 51, 200-01 (2005) (stating that Manet borrowed his 
figures in Raimondi’s engraving from Raphael’s lost drawing The Judgement of Paris); John 
F. Moffitt, Provocative Felinity in Manet’s Olympia, SOURCE: NOTES HIST. ART, Fall 1994, 
at 21, 21 (noting that Manet derived his “cat-plus-courtesan” motif from Titian’s Venus of 
Urbino, which he had seen in Florence about ten years prior). 
35 See Janet A. Walker, Van Gogh, Collector of “Japan,” 32 COMPARATIST 82, 92-96 
(2008) (discussing techniques, compositions, and subject matter of Japanese woodcut prints 
imitated by van Gogh). 
36 See Gail Levin, Edward Hopper: His Legacy for Artists, in EDWARD HOPPER AND THE 
AMERICAN IMAGINATION 109, 114 (Julie Grau ed., 1995) (“Puerto Rican Wedding is a kind 
of neighborhood corner view. . . . Of course another part of it is, I think a kind of reference to 
Edward Hopper’s Nighthawks. One side of the painting is sort of a café view which isn’t really 
like or isn’t set up like an imitation of Nighthawks, but still refers to it very much.”). 
37 See ARTHUR LUBOW, DIANE ARBUS: PORTRAIT OF A PHOTOGRAPHER 376 (2016) 
(explaining portrait of Roselle twins becoming, “through its evocation in Stanley Kubrick’s 
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Examples like these imply that every copyright plaintiff who asserts an if 
value/then right claim against a downstream borrower has herself borrowed from 
those upstream to her.38 In most if not all cases, those borrowings by copyright 
plaintiffs have not been paid for.39 I would venture to guess that there is no such 
thing as an author who has paid everyone from whom a creative benefit has been 
derived. 
The unpaid debts that every author owes bring nuance to our understanding 
of if value/then right, which operates on the premise that downstream defendants 
who do not pay their upstream sources enjoy an unjustified windfall.40 In a sense, 
when those defendants fail to pay, they become wealthier than they should be 
while making the upstream authors poorer than they should be.41 Making 
downstream defendants pay presumably fixes both of these problems by putting 
both plaintiff and defendant where they should be.42 
But what happens if our hypothetical upstream author (Person B) has unpaid 
debts to sources upstream from her? Unless these debts get paid, our 
hypothetical author will enjoy unjust windfalls as surely as the downstream 
defendant that she is suing.43 One might take the position that no problem exists 
because no one is suing our hypothetical author (Person B). If that were the case, 
we might infer that none of those possible plaintiffs cares about the unpaid debt. 
However, this position is not airtight. The possible plaintiffs might not know 
about our author’s borrowings. Alternatively, they might care but believe 
(perhaps correctly) that they would face significant obstacles trying to recover. 
Indeed, they might simply be less brazen about asserting borderline intellectual 
property rights than our hypothetical author. 
Accordingly, if the legal system takes seriously the idea of trying to make 
sure all unpaid creative borrowings get paid for, there is a lot of work to do. 
 
film The Shining and countless other reproductions, an image almost as iconic as Edvard 
Munch’s The Scream. Its chief qualify is instead something otherworldly, a haunted stillness 
and strangeness”). 
38 See Buelow, supra note 30, at 65-67 (highlighting borrowings by Handel in his 
compositions); Læssøe, supra note 34, at 201 (acknowledging Manet’s borrowings from 
Raphael’s The Judgment of Paris); Levin, supra note 36, at 113-15 (explaining that Brown 
borrowed from Hopper’s Nighthawks). 
39 See Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 78 (2004) (“All artists create using much they have not themselves 
created, both in terms of physical and human surroundings and in terms of cultural heritage.”). 
40 See id. at 76 (explaining that artists borrowing downstream may feel obligated to create 
or may create out of gratitude as they are not providing monetary consideration). 
41 See id. at 86 (“[T]he person free of copyright obligations receives what feels like a 
gift. . . . The dark view of gift . . . emphasizes the resentment to which gift can give rise and 
the relations of unequal status that it can enforce.”). 
42 See id. at 80 (“Denying them use of a work or making them pay for it simply restores 
them to their status quo ante, the classic function of corrective justice.”). 
43 See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (describing downstream authors 
benefiting from work of upstream authors without repaying debts). 
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Many if not infinite claims must be brought and adjudicated before society can 
have any confidence that all figurative accounts have been settled.44 Candidly, 
this state of affairs is so unlikely to be reached that, if we consider the settling 
of accounts important, some kind of injustice will persist indefinitely. 
There is, however, an alternative. Society could decide to forgive the debts 
associated with certain borrowings. For example, these borrowings might be 
minimal45 or take only stock items that appear in many similar works.46 
Regardless, the idea here is that there are certain types of borrowings that every 
author commits—borrowings sufficiently common that it makes no sense for 
society to make them the subject of lawsuits.47 Instead, it is better to recognize 
that every author “victimizes” those upstream with such borrowing and that 
every author (or at least every reasonably successful author) gets “victimized” 
by those downstream who borrow this way. Deciding that all of these open 
accounts are forgiven is simpler and fairer than trying to settle them all through 
litigation.48 
The foregoing shows that if value/then right is not necessarily a force for the 
expansion of intellectual property rights. It works that way only when considered 
 
44 See Gordon, supra note 39, at 89 (finding “wide range of contexts in which 
imposing . . . a duty to negotiate and pay for licenses generates on the whole more costs than 
benefits for society”). 
45 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
46 See Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Reyher v. 
Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976)) (finding that scenes 
resulting from choice of setting or situation are unprotectible “scenes a faire”); Reyher, 533 
F.2d at 91 (“Copyrights, then, do not protect thematic concepts or scenes which necessarily 
must follow from certain similar plot situations.”). 
47 See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (establishing numerous documented 
borrowings not subject to litigation). 
48 Similar reasoning underlies the concept of average reciprocity of advantage in property 
law. In the seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), 
Pennsylvania Coal complained that antisubsidence laws made some of its coal worthless 
because it could not excavate the coal without causing the land above to subside. Pennsylvania 
Coal therefore argued that the laws effected a Fifth Amendment taking of its property. Id. at 
414-15 (finding that inability to mine coal robs coal of intrinsic value constituting a taking 
under Fifth Amendment). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pennsylvania Coal. Id. at 416. 
In so ruling, the Court used average reciprocity of advantage to differentiate simple, 
constitutional regulation from laws that imposed unconstitutional takings. Id. at 415-16 
(balancing rights of public against rights of private landowners). Simple regulations might 
impose burdens on property owners, but the overall burdens and benefits of the regulatory 
scheme would roughly balance out. See id. at 415 (distinguishing between eminent domain 
and taking of private property). By contrast, laws that placed disproportionate burdens on a 
few property owners while conferring benefits on others would not exhibit an average 
reciprocity of advantage, thereby becoming constitutionally vulnerable. Id. at 416 (“We are 
in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough 
to warrant achieving the desire by shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change.”). 
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narrowly, as a principle to be deployed between one plaintiff and one defendant. 
However, when if value/then right gets applied to all authors or an entire 
community of authors, it suggests that some borrowings should not be actionable 
and therefore limits intellectual property rights. Indeed, this conception of if 
value/then right might explain why copyright has limiting doctrines such as the 
idea/expression dichotomy, fair use, and substantial similarity.49 Perhaps those 
doctrines excuse borrowings of the sort that all authors commit “against” one 
another. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this brief Essay to explore fully the 
consequences of if value/then right. However, it is my hope that future 
scholarship concerning this principle considers more fully the source of its 
appeal and the possibility that if value/then right can limit the scope of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
49 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
